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Abstract
In this paper, I examine the trends of fiscal transfers between the state and workers
during 1959 - 2012 to understand the net impact of redistributive policy in the United
States. This paper presents original net social wage data from and analysis based on
the replication and extension of Shaikh and Tonak (2002). The paper investigates the
appearance of a post-2001 variation in the net social wage data. The positive net social
wage in the 21st century is the result of a combination of factors including the growth
of income support, healthcare inflation, neoliberal tax reforms, and macroeconomic
instability. Growing economic inequality does not appear to alter the results of the
net social wage methodology.
JEL classification codes— H5 National Government Expenditures and Related Poli-
cies, E62 Fiscal Policy, E64 Incomes Policy, B5 Current Heterodox Approaches
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1 Introduction
The United States is not known for an unwavering commitment to redistributive social
spending. Considered the prototypical liberal market welfare state, the United States is
marked by its stingy contributory and means-tested social programs (Esping-Andersen
1990, 48). Both academic and casual observers of the U.S. welfare state generally take it
for granted that since the 1980s, the U.S. fiscal policy has become less generous towards
workers, favoring corporations over households.1 But how does the political economy
of U.S. redistributive policy show up in the aggregate data? Do the national accounts
confirm that workers are paying more and getting less?
Onemethod of measuring the net effect of redistributive policy can be found in Anwar
M. Shaikh and E. Ahmet Tonak’s, “The Rise and the Fall of the U.S. Welfare State" (2000).
This article analyze the “net social wage" which is the total incidence of labor benefits,
minus labor taxes.2 Shaikh and Tonak found that between 1952 and 1997, the average
net social wage was approximately zero (2000, 256). This leads to the conclusion that,“In
effect, workers paid for their own social benefits" (Shaikh 2003, 542). Furthermore, the net
social wage in the second half of the 20th century was within narrows bounds of positive
or negative 3 percent of GDP. For this reason, Shaikh (2003) argues that because the net
social wage was so small relative to the size of the economy, social programs cannot be
legitimately blamed for poor growth or other deleterious macroeconomic effects (547).
This paper replicates themethodology and extends the data series in Shaikh and Tonak
(2000) in order to examine fiscal transfers between the state and workers in the United
States in the 21st century. Strikingly, the updated net social wage data reveals a sizable
deviation starting in 2002, with much higher positive net social wages for a decade. In
fact, the net social wage rises to a historic high of positive 8.6 percent of GDP in 2010.
One who is well-versed in the history of the neoliberal transformation of the U.S.
economy may be surprised that the findings of this paper show that the 21st century
has diverged from the pattern of a small or zero net social wage as observed by Shaikh
and Tonak (2000). Many academics expected that neoliberal policies would ultimately
dismantle the welfare state and curb fiscal redistribution to workers. This is because in
addition to free trade and deregulation, Reagan’s “trickle-down economics" espoused re-
ductions in spending and taxation as way to increase investment and economic growth
1Since the dawn of the neoliberal era, the United States, like other countries, has experienced a backlash
against the welfare state and redistributive policy towards workers. While the relative progressivity of the
U.S. tax system is a contentious issue, efforts to change the tax laws that favor corporate interests overworkers
is met with strong resistance (Prante and Hodge 2013, Davis et al 2015).
2In addition to Shaikh and Tonak (2000), a number of other authors have examined the net social wage in
the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand as well as various European countries including Sweden,
Norway, Germany, United Kingdom, among others (Blank 2014, Maniatis 2014, Fazeli 2012, Fazeli and Fazeli
2010, Shaikh 2003, Maniatis 1992, Shaikh and Tonak 1987, Tonak 1984). Studies that have surveyed the net
social wage have found that on average, labor pays for its own benefits, and sometimes pays more than it
receives.
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(Blyth 2002, 173).3 According to Reagan and his supporters, social programs created in
the 1930s under the New Deal or in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the Great Society were
impediments to economic prosperity (Blyth 2002, 179). Reaganworked to block grant pro-
grams as a means to delegate responsibility of financing social programs to state govern-
ments, which cannot operate at a deficit.4 By Reagan’s second term there were “modest"
increases in programs for low-income households (Pierson 1996, 165). However, in light
of the degradation of labor standards, the undermining of workers’ ability to organize,
and the erosion of employer-based pension and healthcare benefits,5 “public coverage ex-
pansions appear more like Band-Aids on a festering wound than an inexorable expansion
of public protection" (Hacker 2004, 253). Following the Reagan and Bush administrations,
many see the Clinton era as the real triumph of neoliberalism (Blyth 2002, 201). Clin-
ton signaled the end of “the era of big government" when he vowed to “end welfare as
we know it" with the 1996 passing of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA, or “welfare reform") (Blyth 2002, 199-200). These policies
set the stage for George W. Bush and Barack Obama’s presidencies, which despite their
political party differences, are both strongly associated with the neoliberal paradigm.
The aim of this paper is to explain and interpret why neoliberal governments would
tolerate a growing discrepancy between labor benefits and taxation. We are especially
interested in accounting for the major post-2001 discrepancy in the net social wage data.
This paper investigates trends of state spending and taxation data to better understand
how fiscal redistribution is affected by demographic changes, rising healthcare costs, ne-
oliberal policy reforms, growing inequality, and countercyclical tendencies. To do this, we
will investigate what is causing the variation in the net social wage. The investigations
in this paper fall into three main categories. The first set of investigations will try to un-
3During this time, a number of significant legal changes favored business over labor. The assault on labor
spearheaded a number of legal changes in the United States that undermined workers’ wages, protections,
collective bargaining, and employer-based benefits. This was part of business’s “coordinated campaign of
noncooperation with organized labor" (Blyth 2002, 180). The legal attacks were made on two important
levels: one was the disciplining of labor through anti-labor legislation. By the early 1980s, the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), which was established in the 1930s, was taken over by Reagan appointees who
reversed 40 percent of pro-labor decisions made in the 1970s, in favor of business (Harvey 2005, 52). In what
is considered a highly significant dispute in U.S. labor history, in 1981, Reagan fired the striking air-traffic
controllers (PATCO) and banned them from federal jobs (Blyth 2002, 182). The second component of the
legislative erosion of worker protections included legal changes to employer-based benefits, such as the 1974
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which changed pension and health insurance structure.
The result was lower rates of employer-based health insurance and pension coverage. Not surprisingly, such
anti-labor policies decreased rates of unionization significantly and amounted to “a major privatization of
risk" and lowered real wages (Hacker 2004, 253-255).
4Putting anti-poverty programs under the purview of the states meant that workers suffered considerably
as the minimum wage, unemployment benefits, Food Stamps, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC, or “welfare") declined or did not keep upwith inflation (Hacker 2004, 251). At the same time, funding
for subsidized housing was also reduced (Pierson 1996, 164).
5For example, by shifting to defined contributions (401k) plans from traditional defined benefit pension
plans, or by offering high-deductible healthcare plans.
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derstand how the deviation in the net social wage data is affected by social spending on
income support, which is closely tied to tax policy and healthcare inflation. We will inves-
tigate if the positive net social wage is being driven by demographic shifts that increase
spending on programs for older workers and retirees such as Social Security and Medi-
care. We will also consider how much anti-poverty programs contribute to the rise in the
net social wage. Next, we will consider how the net social wage is related to the business
cycle, as much of the U.S. welfare state is designed to be countercyclical. The final set
of investigations turns our examination towards how the growth of economic inequality
in the neoliberal era may affect the net social wage methodology. We will examine the
role of the labor share in constructing the data, and if in the neoliberal era this is still an
appropriate measure for understanding how workers are affected by social policy.
This paper will be structured as follows. First, we will review the net social wage
methodology. Second, we will discuss the updated data in more detail. Third, we will
investigatewhat caused the deviation in the net social wage data in the 21st century. Based
on this research, this paper argues that the positive net social wage in the 21st century is
the result of a combination of factors including the growth of income support, healthcare
inflation, neoliberal tax reforms, andmacroeconomic instability. While growing economic
inequality is both a cause and an effect of U.S. social policy, it does not appear to alter the
results of the net social wage methodology.
2 Net Social Wage Methodology
The net social wage estimates, as developed by Shaikh and Tonak (1987), show if there
has been a net transfer from capital to workers, vis-a-vis the state, or if workers have self-
financed the benefits they receive. The net social wage (NSW) is calculated by adding
up all of the fiscal transfers that workers have received from public expenditures, minus
what they pay in taxes.
NetSocialWage = TotalLaborBenefits  TotalLaborTaxes (1)
TotalLaborBenefits = E1 + E2 ⇤ LS (2)
TotalLaborTaxes = T1 + T2 ⇤ LS (3)
The net social wage is distinct from other measures of social expenditures, in that it in-
cludes both traditional welfare state transfers, as well as other state spending, commonly
thought of as public goods, but often excluded from estimates of total social expenditures.
The first type of public expenditure, E1, includes direct payments and transfers, such as
social security, public assistance, and public housing that are assumed to benefit workers
entirely. The second category of expenditures, E2, include goods and services that are
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considered to benefit both labor and capital, such as education, health, recreation, natural
resources, energy, and transportation. Shaikh and Tonak (2000) multiply category E2 by
the labor share (employee compensation / total personal income) as a way to approximate
the share that can be attributed to workers.
To calculate the total incidence of labor taxation, twomain categories of taxation emerge.
The first category, T1, is employee and employer contributions to social insurance that are
considered part of the cost of hiring workers. The second category, T2, includes federal,
state, and local income taxes, personal property taxes, motor vehicle taxes, as well as
miscellaneous taxes and fines. We multiply category T2 by the labor share to estimate
workers’ contributions.
A number of assumptions are embedded in the net social wage methodology. Military
benefits, such as veterans’ pensions and health insurance, are treated as a cost of war,
not as social policy. As discussed in Shaikh and Tonak (1987), administrative spending,
police, and other expenditures are treated as the cost of the state reproduction, not part
of the social wage for workers. While arguments certainly can be made for the inclusion
or exclusion of these and other types of state spending, the net social wage is meant to
measure the effect of state social spending on the civilian population. In addition, the
increase in defense and police spending over time could bias the estimate of the net social
wage upwards, without reflecting the true nature of state spending.
3 Extended Net Social Wage Data Series
The NSW series presented in this paper differs slightly from Shaikh and Tonak’s series.6
This may be due, at least in part, because the NIPA tables were revised several times
since Shaikh and Tonak’s data was constructed, including a comprehensive revision in
1999.7 As illustrated by Figure 1, the NSW follows the same pattern in both sets of data.
The differences in the series in the overlap years (1959 - 1997) are slight (approximately
1 percent of GDP). For this reason, the variation in the series is assumed to be the result
of revisions of NIPA data and the series used in this paper can be considered a faithful
reconstruction of Shaikh and Tonak’s series. In addition to higher average net social wage,
the most significant difference is that in certain years, Shaikh and Tonak’s data shows that
the net social wage was slightly negative, however, the slight increase in my revised series
means that in these same years, the net social wage was slightly positive. This is most
obvious in the time period 1980s - 1990s, an era of particular interest and significance due
to the rise of neoliberalism.
6Shaikh and Tonak (2000) considers the net social wage/ employee compensation. This paper mainly uses
the NSW/GDP ratio, which is constructed using the same methodology and can be found in Shaikh (2003).
7See “A Guide to the NIPAs." http://www.ciser.cornell.edu
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Figure 1: Comparison of the U.S. Net Social Wage/GDP, 1959 - 2012
Authors Min Median Mean Max
Shaikh and Tonak -0.021 -0.002 -0.000 0.029
Moos -0.012 0.01 0.011 0.037
Table 1: Comparison of Summary Statistics of U.S. NSW/GDP Data, 1959-1997
Variable Min Median Mean Max
NSW -13.18 54.87 212.60 1288.00
Real NSW (2010 dollars) -76.48 119.40 255.10 1288.00
NSW/ GDP -0.012 0.013 0.020 0.086
NSW/EC -0.022 0.024 0.037 0.161
Table 2: Summary Statistics of U.S. NSW Data, 1959-2012
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4 The Net Social Wage in the 21st Century
The revised and extended data offers new complexity to our understanding of the U.S. net
social wage. In Figure 1, we see that the net social wage/GDP ratio has been positive since
the 1970s. Even more strikingly, after 2002, the net social wage / GDP ratio is at a very
high level for a decade. In 2010, it reaches a high of 8.6 percent of GDP. In Figure 2, we
can see that after 1970, the NSW as a ratio of employee compensation was positive. It is
compelling that U.S. fiscal policy appears to be more redistributive towards labor during
the neoliberal era, especially in the 21st century. This section will investigate what may
have contributed to the divergence of labor benefits and taxation. There are a number of
aspects of the neoliberal era, especially in the 21st century, that may help us understand
the positive net social wage.
The first investigationwill look at the role of income support, and how that has changed
in the neoliberal era. The issue of income support is closely tied to demographic factors,
the rise of low-wage jobs, and neoliberal tax policy reform, in particular the growing role
of tax expenditures in U.S. redistributive policy. Income support also includes the two
major public health insurance programs, Medicare and Medicaid, so we will also con-
sider the role that healthcare inflation may play in the positive net social wage. Next, we
will consider the role that the business cycle has played in contributing to a positive net
social wage, in particular the consequences of poor macroeconomic performance which
trigger automatic stabilizers and additional stimulative policy. Finally, we will consider
the implications of rising economic inequality on the net social wage methodology.
4.1 Understanding U.S. Income Support
Figure 3 compares the share of the major components of labor benefits.8 The share that
income support makes as a component of all GDP rises steadily, and is by far the largest
component of the net social wage in terms of GDP.9 The growing share of income sup-
port, from 2.5 percent of GDP to 12.5 percent of GDP over the time studied, potentially
challenges the conclusion of Shaikh and Tonak (2000) that “net transfers... have a very
limited impact on the standard of living of workers" (256). It appears that income support
is a major component of the social benefits that workers receive. In the context of a posi-
tive net social wage, it is important to understand what is driving this growth in income
support spending.
In the United States, workers’ incomes are not supported universally. The most signif-
icant sources of income support go to two demographic groups: seniors and low-income
households. To better understand how income support for these populations is contribut-
8This figure excludes Natural Resources, Postal, Employment/Training, Recreation/Culture which are all
extremely small shares of GDP.
9Note that the “health" category contains funding for hospitals and clinics, not public health insurance
programs such as Medicare or Medicaid which are categorized as “income support."
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Figure 2: U.S. Net Social Wage/Employee Compensation, 1959 - 2012
ing to the net social wage data, we will analyze the programs designed to support these
two groups.10
4.1.1 Support for Seniors
In order to understand how programs for older Americans are affecting the net social
wage, we will look at the biggest programs for this demographic: Social Security, Medi-
care, and pensions and disabilities. From Figure 4, we can see that the major old-age
programs as a percentage of GDP have risen over this time period. In particular, there
was growth from old-age spending from 2.5 percent of GDP in 1959, to 5.8 of GDP in
1980. From 1980 to 2005, the ratio of old-age spending to GDP varied between 6 and 7
percent. From 2006 to 2012, there was more rapid growth, with the ratio reaching 8.5 per-
cent of GDP in 2012. From Figure 5, we can see that, unsurprisingly, Social Security and
Medicare contribute the most to the public provision of support for the elderly. Particu-
larly after 1980, we can see that the cost of Social Security went from just over 100 billion
10There are programs that support low-income seniors, such as Social Security Income, and programs
which are available to low-income individuals regardless of age (such as utility support). Because the funding
for these programs are relatively small, they are not included in this part of the analysis, although they are
captured in the aggregate net social wage data.
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Figure 3: Components of Social Expenditures / GDP
8
to close to 800 billion in 2010.
The growth of old-age spending is not surprising. As life expectancy increases, the
older population grows, and so will spending for older populations.11 In 2011, the eldest
of the Baby Boomer cohort, those born between 1946 and 1964, reached retirement age.
As this large cohort ages, spending on entitlement programs for older population will
grow, both in relative and absolute levels. However, it is not clear that the positive net
social wage can be wholly attributed to demographic factors, as the major deviation we
are trying to explain happened nearly a decade before any of the Baby Boomer cohort
became eligible for Social Security or Medicare.
Figure 4: Major Old-Age Program Spending/GDP
4.1.2 Support for Low-Income Households
To understand how income support for low-income households has affected the net so-
cial wage data, we will create a variable of the three largest anti-poverty programs: the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as Food Stamps),
refundable tax credits (includes the Earned Income Tax Credit, EITC, and the refundable
Child Tax Credit), and Medicaid. In Figure 6, we can see that the three major sources
11Compared to other advanced industrialized countries, the United States is considered relatively young
due to the influx of younger immigrant workers and higher fertility rates (He, GoodKind, Kowa, 2016).
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Figure 5: Major Old-Age Programs in Billions
of income support for low-income households have increased as a share of GDP steadily
since the mid-1960s and 1970s when the programs were expanded and created. Medicare
and Medicaid were signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson in July 1965. The
EITC was first enacted by President Ford in 1975 (Hungerford and Thiess 2013). In 1964,
President Johnson signed the Food Stamp Act which made the program permanent, but
it was not expanded to all 50 states until 1974. In 1977, the program was modernized and
expanded.12
Despite rhetoric to “end welfare" the most dramatic growth in social spending on in-
come support occurred between 1990 - 1995, when spending for the three largest income
support programs went from 1.5 percent of GDP to nearly 2.5 percent of GDP. This is
undoubtably due to Bill Clinton’s expansions of refundable tax credits during that pe-
riod. Here we see that the costs of the major programs for low-income individuals and
households, SNAP/Food Stamps, Medicaid, and EITC have increased since the 1980s. In
Figure 7, we see that the growth of refundable tax credits and SNAP are actually dwarfed
in comparison to the growth of spending on Medicaid since the 1980s, which went from
96.1 billion in 1991 to 396.6 billion in 2010. Part of this growth can be attributed to the es-
tablishment of the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) in 1997, which provides
12See U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, “A Short History of SNAP." https:
//www.fns.usda.gov/snap/short-history-snap Last updated 2014.
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federal funds to states which provide health insurance coverage for low-income children.
Figure 6: Major Low-Income Programs/GDP
4.1.3 Tax Expenditures and Refundable Tax Credits
To better understand the dramatic rise in the net social wage in the 21st century, we must
examine the growing discrepancy between the two components of the net social wage,
workers’ benefits and taxes. As Figure 8 shows, workers’ benefits and taxes had a similar
growth path from 1959-1990, with slight variations that sum to a non-zero net social wage.
However, from 1990 - 1999, we see that taxes did not keep up with the increase in benefits,
although both increased from year to year. In 2000, the net social wage was approximately
zero, but then taxes decreased as benefits rose. While taxes began to rise again, they
continue to be much lower. Tax revenue fell again in 2009, and by then a significant gap
had arisen between the two variables.
Figure 9 shows the biggest components of taxes: federal income taxes, state income
taxes, and property taxes. Here we can see that federal income taxes display much greater
variability than state income or property taxes. In fact, we can see that federal income
tax revenue dropped significantly after the dot-com bubble burst in 2001 and after the
financial crisis of 2007-2008. Here we see that the Bush tax cuts, which were continued
under Obama, have played a major role. From the data, we can see the effect of a number
11
Figure 7: Major Low-Income Programs in Billions
Figure 8: U.S. Labor Benefits and Taxes, 1959 - 2012
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of neoliberal tax reforms that affected both high and low earners.
While the Economic Growth and Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA)
is often associatedwith its reductions in capital gains, estate, and gift taxes for thewealthy,
it also reduced income taxes for nearly all wage-brackets and created tax incentives for
savings for retirement and education. It also increased the child tax credit from $500 to
$1000 (Hungerford and Thiess 2013). Together with the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Rec-
onciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003, EGTRRA lowered marginal tax rates for all income
brackets. President Obama’s Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization and
Job Creation Act of 2010, and the partial extension of the American Taxpayer Relief Act
of 2012 continued the vast majority of these tax cuts for high income and wealthy Amer-
icans (Huang 2013, 1). These tax cuts reduced tax revenue for the U.S. government, and
contributed to the positive net social wage.13.
Redistribution through tax expenditures became increasingly popular in the neolib-
eral era. Tax expenditures, which include exclusions, exemptions, deductions, credits,
and deferrals, play an important role in welfare provision and redistributive policy in the
United States. As discussed byHoward (1997) in The HiddenWelfare State: Tax Expenditures
and Social Policy in the United States, indirect financing through tax expenditures contribute
significantly to actual public spending in the United States. Steinmo (2010) emphasizes
that contrary to how they are treated by the government or understood by recipients, tax
expenditures are social spending (154). According to Steinmo (2010), “In sum, although
most people don’t see it this way, the United States has an extensive and expensive social
welfare state. But instead of providing benefits through direct public spending, it spends
huge sums through the tax code" (159). Tax expenditures can be targeted to very specific
groups of people or types of households, such as those with children, who save or pur-
chase certain types of investments, or who make charitable donations. In this way, the
redistributive activity of the state is not only “hidden" as argued by Howard (1997), but
also made more complicated. This type of tax policy does not necessarily constitute a co-
herent redistributive policy strategy, but rather the amalgamation of efforts to win over
specific factions and special interests. Furthermore, according to Steinmo (2010) public
policy pursued with tax expenditures, rather than direct social spending, affects not only
redistribution, but also the efficacy of achieving social welfare aims. For example, rather
than provide universal childcare in the United States, childcare is subsidized through tax
credits. This policy offsets the cost of care for many middle-class families, but does not
cover the entire cost of childcare, nor benefit lower-income households (154).
Tax expenditures fall into two main categories: refundable and nonrefundable credits.
Non-refundable tax credits reduce an individual’s or household’s tax liability by claim-
ing certain credits or deductions, but only apply to filers who owe taxes. For this reason,
non-refundable tax credits do not benefit households with low incomes. Refundable tax
13While neoliberal tax reforms were usually justified with the Laffer Curve, which claims that tax cuts will
increase government revenue, our analysis of tax revenue in the 21st century have demonstrated the opposite
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credits, on the other hand, are paid to tax filers that have no tax liability as a tax refund.
This type of tax spending tends to quell critics of traditional transfer programs for low-
income households by supporting and incentivizing work. Refundable tax credits are
also popular with anti-poverty advocates for being a significant source of income support
for the working poor. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) grew out of the idea of the
Negative Income Tax, which was originally proposed by Milton Friedman in the 1960s
as a way to reduce the disincentives to work that were believed to be caused by tradi-
tional cash transfer programs (OECD 2005, 149). The EITC has since become the largest
anti-poverty program in the United States, and is applauded for increasing labor supply,
especially among single mothers (Gruber 2013, 637). During the neoliberal era, refund-
able tax credits were expanded. EITC was expanded first in 1986, and then again in the
1990s when many other anti-poverty programs were being defunded (Steinmo 2010, 197).
Tax expenditures on refundable tax credits went from 1.3 billion in 1980 to 96.5 billion in
2010.
Figure 9: Tax Revenue in Billions
4.1.4 Healthcare Inflation
The analysis of income support programs shows that spending on programs for the el-
derly and the poor are growing as percentages of GDP. Spending on public health insur-
14
ance for elderly and low-income populations, Medicare and Medicaid, respectively, are
large components of the spending on income support. In fact, spending on Medicare in-
creased from 36.2 billion in 1980 to 513.6 billion in 2010. Spending on Medicaid increased
from 23.9 billion in 1980 to 396.6 billion in 2010. While the U.S. is an outlier among ad-
vanced industrialized countries for not having a universal or comprehensive approach to
health insurance, the U.S. government continues to be a major provider of health insur-
ance for the U.S. population. In fact, in 2011, Medicare and Medicaid covered 15 percent
and 12 percent of the U.S. population, respectively. Furthermore, in 2011, public spending
accounted for 48 percent of total health spending (Thomson, Osborn, and Squires 2013).
Medicare is financed through a combination of payroll taxes, premiums, and federal gen-
eral revenues. Medicaid is funded through a combination of federal and state funds and
is administered by states. Both programs are entitlement programs for those who qual-
ify (based on age, income, or disability status). For this reason, we can interpret the rise
in spending on these programs not as the state becoming more generous, but due to the
structure of entitlement programs that ensure eligibility for those who qualify.
It is also important to note that the increase in spending on Medicare and Medicaid
is also due to high healthcare costs in the United States. From 2000 to 2010, the increase
of total health expenditures was 6.6 percent per year on average which exceeded annual
GDP growth (Holahan et al 2011, 1). While spending on healthcare overall decreased
during the Great Recession, healthcare costs remain high in the United States relative to
other countries (Squires and Anderson 2015, 11). The high cost of American healthcare is
due to a number of factors including the high administrative costs associated with U.S.
healthcare system, the fee-for-service model which is believed to encourage more tests
and treatments, the lack of price transparency, and the fact that the U.S. government fails
to regulate prices effectively. In addition, the increase in costs for U.S. healthcare is also
thought to be due to Baumol’s cost disease, which refers to rising costs as a result of
increased labor costs in sectors that have not experienced labor productivity gains. The
results in Bates and Santerre (2013) which studies healthcare costs in all 50 states suggest
that Baumol’s cost disease has led to increased costs in U.S. healthcare.
Healthcare inflation, regardless of its cause, should be understood as contributing to
the increase on U.S. public expenditures on Medicare and Medicaid. It is important to
note that an increase in public health insurance spending does not necessarily represent
an expansion to workers’ social wage. If the cost of a necessary treatment or procedure
increases over time, due to Baumol’s disease or the particular dysfunctions of the U.S.
healthcare system, it does not follow that workers’ social wage has actually increased, as
they received the treatment, not its cash equivalent.
In March 2010, the Patient Protection and American Affordable Care Act (ACA) re-
formed the healthcare system. While it did not create the universal healthcare system that
many had hoped for, Skocpol and Jacobs (2011) believe it was “a landmark in modern
U.S. social legislation, comparable to Social Security, Medicare, and the Civil Rights Act"
(54-55). In addition to the controversial individual mandate, the ACA included numer-
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ous reforms such as: increased spending on primary care (and the elimination of co-pays
for preventive services, including immunization) for Medicare and Medicaid enrollees,
expansions in Medicaid, subsidies for low and middle income people to purchase insur-
ance, the establishment of state-based insurance markets or “exchanges", tax credits for
small business, increased federal spending on health centers for low-income and unin-
sured populations, and made it illegal to deny coverage based on so-called preexisting
conditions (Thomson, Osborn, and Squires 2013, 131). At the time of writing, efforts to
overturn the healthcare law in the Supreme Court or to “repeal and replace" the ACA by
the Trump Administration and a Republican-controlled Congress have failed.
4.2 Macroeconomic and Business Cycle Effects
As Figure 10 demonstrates, the inflation adjusted net social wage (2010 constant dollars)
was relatively stable from 1959 - 1990, with increases during recessionary periods (NBER
recessions marked by shaded areas). Despite expansions in the welfare state during the
Great Society years of the late 1960s and 1970s, the net social wage did not increase sig-
nificantly until the recession following the 1973 oil shock. However, there was a slight in-
crease in the net social wage in the mid-1970s, which then came down by the early 1980s.
The 1980s mark a downward trajectory for the net social wage, which then rises steadily
during the short recession that lasted from July 1990 through March 1991. However, the
early and mid-1990s experienced a sustained higher level of net social wage, which then
decreased after 1996. By 2000, the NSW/GDP was approximately zero (0.0065), mean-
ing that workers were no longer experiencing redistribution from the state. The dot com
bubble in 2001 sparked an increase in the net social wage to a hitherto unseen level. The
upward trend of the net social wage became much more extreme at the beginning of the
crisis in 2007. While the net social wage appears to be on a slight downward trajectory
from its peak in 2010, it was at an historically high level by 2012.
The U.S. economy experienced two major shocks in the 21st century, first with the
dot com bubble from April 1997 - June 2003, and the Great Recession which began in
December 2007 and was worsened by the financial crisis that began in September 2008.
Many social programs are countercyclical by design, such as unemployment insurance,
or means-tested programs such as SNAP/Food Stamps. It is therefore not surprising to
see an increase in benefits during economic slumps. Likewise, as economic activity and
employment shrink in a recession, tax revenue will also decrease. Viewing the net social
wage as a countercyclical variable, it is unsurprising to observe high NSW levels dur-
ing and after a severe financial crisis. However, observing the evolution of the net social
wage over time, we see that the high levels of NSW in the 21st century were truly unprece-
dented. Throughout our observed time, the U.S. economy has experienced a number of
recessionary periods that did not result in such a prolonged deviation between the two
variables. The fact that economic shocks of previous decades were not accompanied by
such a dramatic rise in the net social wage raises the question about what made the labor
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Figure 10: U.S. Real Net Social Wage (2010 dollars), 1959 - 2012
benefits and taxation deviate from one another in the 21st century.
One plausible explanation is that the Great Recession was unlike other periods of eco-
nomic crisis in the data series. It is undeniable that the Great Recession was the worst
economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. During 2008-2009, GDP declined
4.7 percent and the unemployment rate increased 5.6 percent (Kotz 2015, 152). The sever-
ity of the Great Recession, in terms of the decline in investment, employment, and the
long duration of the crisis, may help explain why the net social wage increased substan-
tially during this era. In 2008, GDP did not grow, whereas in 2009 GDP fell by 2.6 percent.
Between December 2007 and 2009, 8.3 million workers lost their jobs, creating an unem-
ployment rate of 10 percent (Thompson and Smeeding 2013, 2).
4.2.1 Unemployment Effects
Examining the NSW/GDP ratio in context of the unemployment rate illuminates the re-
lationship between a contraction in economic activity and the increase in the net social
wage in the 21st century. Shaikh and Tonak observed that during the period 1952 - 1997,
net social wage “variations are substantially driven by variations in the rate of unemploy-
ment" (Shaikh and Tonak 2000, 255). There is certainly a close relationship between the
NSW/GDP and the unemployment rate. However, as we can see from Figure 11, this
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relationship is not consistent throughout the period of study. In 1983 and 2010, the unem-
ployment level reached a high of 9.6 percent, however, the same unemployment rate was
accompanied by NSW/GDP ratios of 2.1 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively. This snap-
shot suggests that the net social wage is not driven solely by the unemployment level, as
Shaikh and Tonak (2000) suggest.
Figure 11: Unemployment Rate and NSW/GDP, 1959 - 2012
The unemployment rate is a notoriously problematic variable for estimating the ex-
tent of the labor force that is inadequately employed. In fact, a number of alternative
measures to the official unemployment rate estimate a much higher level of joblessness
and under-employment (Federal Reserve Bank of Philadephia 2014). Shaikh (2013) con-
structed a measure of “unemployment intensity" to capture the effect of unemployment
on the long-term unemployed. Unemployment intensity is the product of the unemploy-
ment rate and an index of unemployment duration (2013, 14). Such a measure can add
insight to our understanding of the cyclical nature of the NSW. Figure 12 plots the rate of
unemployment intensity and the traditional unemployment rate. Here we begin to under-
stand why the net social wage reached unprecedented heights in the Great Recession: at
this time, there was also an unprecedented level of unemployment intensity. In 1983, the
level of unemployment intensity was 18.95 percent, whereas in 2010 it was 31.46 percent,
see Table 3.
18
Figure 12: Unemployment Rate and Unemployment Intensity Rate, 1959 - 2012
4.2.2 Jobless Recovery and the Net Social Wage
The effectiveness and responsiveness of the U.S. safety net has been tested due to the Great
Recession. Automatic stabilizers such as unemployment insurance, SNAP/Food Stamps,
and other countercyclical programs increase during times of recession. Under President
Obama, there were a number of reforms that strengthened social protections. In response
to the crisis and the growing discomfort with corporate bailouts, the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) amounted to $787 billion in spending and tax cuts
that expanded social programs for low and middle-income Americans, as well as created
new government spending and jobs (Skocpol and Jacobs 2011, 61). The ARRA included
increases in transfers programs such as unemployment insurance, SNAP/Food Stamps,
TANF, EITC, as well as tax cuts, infrastructure projects, and easing of fiscal pressure on
state governments (Thompson and Smeeding 2013, 4).
Expansionary fiscal and monetary policy helped the economy recover. By July 2009,
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) declared the Great Recession over (Pa-
padimitriou, Hannsgen, and Zezza 2011, 4). However, the expansion of output growth
without correspondingly high rates of employment have led many to call this a jobless
recovery (Schmitt-Grohé and Úribe 2007; Papadimitriou, Hannsgen, and Zezza 2011). In
December 2010, employment still lagged below trend by 19 million jobs, or 8 percent.
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Furthermore, household survey conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) found
that approximately 1 million people had become discouraged from looking for a job even
though they still wanted to work, and another 5 percent of the workforce were involuntar-
ily working part-time while searching for full-time employment (Papadimitriou, Hanns-
gen, and Zezza 2011, 5-6). Years after the Great Recession was considered to be over,
millions of people are still unable to find jobs (Thompson and Smeeding 2013, 2). The fact
that the Great Recession “ended" without satisfactory job growth will of course have an
effect on the net social wage.
Variable 1983 2010
Official Unemployment Rate 9.6 9.6
Unemployment Intensity Measure 18.95 31.46
NSW/GDP 2.1 8.6
Table 3: Unemployment Rates and Intensity: Comparison of 1983 and 2010
4.3 Rising Inequality and Methodological Issues
The net social wage methodology relies on broad Marxian categories of “labor" and “cap-
ital". Shaikh and Tonak (2000) define workers as those who rely on wage-labor and who
do not have meaningful access to the means of production.14 In classical political econ-
omy terms, we understand workers as having a particular role in the wage-labor relation-
ship. However, it is clear that U.S. workers are exceedingly diverse, making the idea that
“workers" constitute a homogenous group untenable at any other level of analysis. Since
the 1970s, the U.S. economy has become increasingly unequal, making inequality a defin-
ing characteristic of neoliberal U.S. society (Gould 2015). There has been inequality both
between classes (as capitalists make gains over workers) and within classes (when mea-
sured in terms of income, wealth, or opportunity). For these reasons, the study of the net
social wage does not illuminate the conditions of the working class on a microeconomic
or sociological level, and is therefore limited in its explanatory power.15 Furthermore,
as inequality between and within classes grows, the effect of policy on workers requires
further scrutiny.
It is widely known that in the neoliberal era more aggregate income is going to high-
income earners. Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011) show that since the 1970s, top earners
in the United States have been earning a greater share of overall income. By 2007, the top
14U.S. workers include both those working as well as reserve labor, such as the unemployed, retired, un-
paid caregivers, etc. From the NIPA categories of those that report an income as employee compensation,
this includes both low-income and very high earning workers. From this level of analysis, it is not easy to
differentiate different types of workers in a very stratified society such as the United States.
15See Gould (2015) for data on wage inequality among earners, including by race and gender.
20
10 percent of earners took in 50 percent of all income, whereas the top 1 percent of income
earners gained 12.6 percent of all income (6). During Bill Clinton and George W. Bush’s
presidencies, 45 and 63 percent of total growth was gained by the top 1 percent of earners
(Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011, 9).
There is a growing consensus among some researchers that incomes by top earners
may be more akin to profits than traditional conceptions of wages. Duménil and Lévy
(2004) observe that the “working rich" who they describe as “capitalists who now receive
much of their income in the form of wages" work to “blur class boundaries" (105). Mo-
hun (2006) writes that supervisory labor, as a component of unproductive labor, may be
more identified with and akin to capitalists than to workers. Mohun expands the defini-
tion of the capitalist class to include “those above shop-floor level who exercise functions
of supervision and control" (Mohun 2006, 362). Re-classifying supervisory workers and
removing their wages from the wage share will also yield different empirical results on
distributive shares. In fact, according to Mohun (2006) “The growing extraction of sur-
plus value out of productive labour, which is so marked a feature of the US economy after
1979, was appropriated not as corporate profits, but primarily as the labour incomes of su-
pervisory workers" (360). This has caused authors such as Mohun (2016) and Duenhaupt
(2011) to consider alternative measures of the wage-share that exclude top incomes.16
The net social wage methodology, as employed by Shaikh and Tonak (2000) and repli-
cated in this paper, uses the traditional labor-share measure. For that reason, it is worth
considering how changes in the labor share may be affecting the net social wage results.
For many years, economists assumed the stability of the labor share as a “stylized fact,"
however its fall is now studied as a secular trend (Jacobson and Occhino 2012). It should
be noted that the labor share has declined over the period of study from a high of 0.73 to
a low of 0.62.
In Figure 13 we can see the difference between the traditional labor share and the in-
come share as estimated byMohun (2016). While both the traditional labor share estimate
and Mohun’s income share estimate decline over the time period studied, the decline is
much more dramatic in the latter. Mohun’s income share estimate is lower than the tradi-
tional labor share estimate for the entire time period under consideration, never reaching
0.70. In the mid-1970s, Mohun’s income share estimate falls rapidly and consistently. By
the mid-1990s, Mohun’s income share estimate is below 0.50, while the traditional labor
share is still above 0.65. By the 21st century, the difference between the two variables
appears quite stark, as the traditional labor share varies between 0.625 and 0.675, while
Mohun’s income share estimate is just over 0.45.
In order to understand how an alternative estimate of the labor share would affect
the net social wage data, I reconstructed the net social wage using Mohun’s income share
data provided in Mohun (2016).17 From Figure 14 it is clear that an alternative estimate
16Duenhaupt finds that the traditional wage share and alternative measures of the wage-share diverged
starting in the 1980s, and that the alternative wage share declines more significantly (12).
17This data as well as detailed documentation on how the data was constructed are available on Simon
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Figure 13: Traditional Labor Share and Mohun Income Share, 1959 - 2012
of the labor share does not change our observations about the net social wage data in this
time period. While there are slight variations between the NSW/GDP series estimated
with the traditional labor share and Mohun income shares, the variation is quite small
and does not affect the post-2001 variation which is the main subject of this paper.18
5 Discussion: Managing the Neoliberal Economy
The data presented in this paper describes the ex post incidence of fiscal policy in the
United States. As a class, U.S. workers in the neoliberal era received a net transfer from
the state. Much of the positive net social wage is being driven by growth in income sup-
Mohun’s homepage http://webspace.qmul.ac.uk/smohun/
18The alternative estimate of the income share has a small effect on the net social wage measure because
the components of the net social wage that are affected by the labor share (E2 and T2) are smaller than
the components that are not multiplied by the labor share (E1 and T1). As mentioned in the methodology
section, some components of the net social wage (specifically E2 and T2) are multiplied by the labor share to
estimate workers’ share of these benefits (E2) or taxes (T2). In order to understand how variations in the labor
share may be affecting the net social wage, we will have to think more carefully about what goes into these
categories. On the benefits side (E2), is composed of education, health spending for hospitals and clinics
(excludes health insurance programs such as Medicare/Medicaid), recreation and culture, energy, natural
resources, postal services, and transportation.
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Figure 14: NSW/GDP with Traditional Labor Share and NSW/GDP with Mohun Income
Share, 1959 - 2012
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port spending and a reduction in taxes. This does not appear to be a statistical artifact,
caused by an over-estimated labor share, nor explained solely by demographic factors or
healthcare inflation. How can we explain that despite the ideological tenets of neoliber-
alism and the policies pursued in this era, fiscal policy has become more redistributive
towards workers in the 21st century than in earlier epochs?
Literature on the U.S. welfare state can help explain why neoliberalism did not ef-
fectively eliminate social welfare spending. Although there is a broad consensus that U.S.
policy has become increasingly hostile to workers, social scientists have grappled with the
observation that the neoliberal era did not bring a full retrenchment of the U.S. welfare
state. There are several theories as to why welfare state retrenchment was not more severe
during this time period. One theory is that interest groups emerged as a result of the tar-
geting of social programs to specific populations which defend their own benefits (Hacker
2004, 245; Pierson 1996, 147).19 Another argument is that instead of cutting programs out-
right, public policy erodes the welfare state by failing to improve or modernize programs,
and local implementation and policies are put in place that undermine program access
(Hacker 2004, 256). While these reforms do not amount to “radical retrenchment," these
subtler policies contribute to the “increasingly incomplete protection against the key so-
cial risks that Americans confront" (Hacker 2004, 243). Another argument is that, despite
political rhetoric, the welfare state does not necessarily drive away investment, and there-
fore completely cutting the social wage is not necessary, nor always helpful, to restoring
profitability (Pierson 1996, 149). These arguments help illuminate important aspects of
the limits to retrenchment and realities of the neoliberal welfare state. In particular, they
explain why, as observed by Pierson (1996), the actual reduction in spending on social
programs was less extreme than expected (150). However, this body of literature does not
comment on the net social wage data, and therefore it does not address the findings that
neoliberal fiscal policy appears more redistributive to workers in the 21st century than in
other eras.
In order to understand the meaning and effect of a positive net social wage in the ne-
oliberal era, it is useful to consider how state policy making relates to neoliberalism. In
The Rise and the Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism, Kotz (2015) applies social structure of accumu-
lation (SSA) theory to the U.S. economy. According to Kotz (2015) and others working in
the SSA tradition, a social structure of accumulation consists of distinct institutional ar-
rangements which are used to “stabilize the main conflicts and resolve the main problems
that capitalism tends to produce" (3). The state plays an active role in the economy by
stabilizing relations between classes as well as conflicts between capitalists in the effort
to ensure profitability and accumulation (3-4).20 SSA theory offers a framework for un-
derstanding the different kinds of institutional structures that support capitalism. Fiscal
policy is one among many institutions in the neoliberal SSA. For this reason, we will also
19For example, AARP defends Social Security and other benefits that go to older Americans.
20SSA theorists argue that the given social structure of accumulationwill hold for some time, but eventually
falls into crisis. At this point a new SSA will emerge.
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need to think about the specific role that fiscal policy plays by redistributing resources
between and among classes.
We can understand the positive net social wage as a characteristic of the neoliberal
SSA by better examining the role that the state plays in managing labor in the neoliberal
economy. In The State, Capital and Economic Policy, de Brunhoff (1978) argues that in any
capitalist system, the state must manage labor as a means to preserve the functioning of
the labor market (19). According to de Brunhoff (1978) the state management of labor, in
any form, is designed to preserve the wage-labor relationship through three distinct yet
overlapping aims: work discipline, insecurity of employment, and maintaining a cheap
supply of excess labor (13). While the first two aims are consistent with policy that under-
mines labor’s strength relative to capital, the third aim is more ambiguous. On the one
hand, the state is responsible for ensuring that workers depend on wages, but they are
also responsible for making sure that they are able to survive as a readily available supply
of workers. This means that policy must also ensure that workers are able to reproduce
themselves. For this reason, de Brunhoff (1978) writes that policy, “cannot be based upon
the principles of either charity or equality. Whether they function as poor relief or as wel-
fare, these institutions serve to minimise, or relocate, ‘the specifically proletarian risk’,
constituted by the uncertain condition of the commodity labour-power; they are unable
to eliminate it " (19). Drawing from Kotz and de Brunhoff, we can interpret redistributive
policy as one of the many institutions that stabilizes the neoliberal SSA. More specifically,
we can interpret a positive net social wage as the result of efforts to “minimize or relocate"
some of the effects of the neoliberal capitalist labor market on households and workers.
One facet of the U.S. economy in the neoliberal era is that there has been an expan-
sion of low-wage jobs. In this era, the United States departed from European and other
advanced capitalist nations with regards to job quality. U.S. neoliberal ideology and pol-
icy have worked to promote employment, regardless of how low-paying or low-quality
the job may be. Cross-country studies, such as those in Gautié and Schmitt (2010), find
that in the United States, social benefits for non-working adults are the least generous
and most difficult to obtain. Gautié and Schmitt (2010) conclude that the low social wage
for non-working adults explains why low-wage jobs are so common in the United States
(11). In other words, U.S. workers have no choice but to accept low-wage jobs as the level
of social wage for non-working adults is either non-existent or extremely low. U.S. fiscal
policy incentivizes taking low-wage jobs, as most workers cannot access the social wage
without work (170). Refundable tax credits such as the EITC subsidize low-wage jobs for
both employee and employer. By design they are supposed to “activate" workers who
would be, per neoclassical theory, unwilling to work for a low wage otherwise. In fact,
much of the empirical literature on the effect of the EITC is about understanding its effect
on labor supply for low-wage jobs.21
21See Gruber (2013) for discussion of the post-1986 and later reforms of the EITC and its effect on labor
supply.
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Neoliberal fiscal policy is used to incentivize low-wage jobs through the increasing
of in-work benefits (tax expenditures) and the decreasing of cash transfers not tied to
work (such as welfare). The expansion of low-wage jobs was done in the same era as
when the U.S. government cut funding and eliminated programs for low-income house-
holds and individuals, including the social reproductive activities of low-income, single
mothers. The empirical work of Gautié and Schmitt (2010) found that women, along
with older, younger, less educated, or foreign-born workers were the most likely to be
working in low-wage jobs.22 They write, “In general, national social safety nets provide
these groups with little or no financial support when they are not working, usually be-
cause most national welfare systems continue to reflect their roots in policies designed to
support full-time male ‘breadwinners’ and their nonworking families. Many low-wage
workers - overwhelmingly women - also combine their low-wage employment with sub-
stantial responsibilities for child care and elder care. These extra-market responsibilities
appear to reduce these workers’ bargaining power relative to their employers and fre-
quently lead them to trade reduced or flexible hours for lower pay rates" (Gautié and
Schmitt 2010, 176). In this sense, we can see that the proletarianization of women, in par-
ticular single mothers, was both a cause and an effect of changes in social spending and
the expansion of low-wage work. Older Americans could also be a population that could
be further proletarianized by cutting social wages for seniors.23
The expansion of low-wage work and the decrease in labor’s strength relative to cap-
ital has led to the stagnation of real wages, which has increased working poverty. This
is the result of both social policy, such as the attack on the welfare state, as well as trade
liberalization and deregulation which lead to outsourcing of higher paying jobs in the
manufacturing sector. In terms of social policy, ushering former welfare-recipients into
paid employment was discussed politically as a means to reduce single mothers’ “depen-
dency" on the state.24 The implicit claim is that as wage-earners, workers are self-reliant
and do not need the state to take care of them. However, the reality of wage-labor, espe-
cially in the context of low-wagework, is more nuanced. As argued by de Brunhoff (1978),
by paying wages, capitalists “absolve themselves of responsibility for the upkeep of the
workers" (13). The expectation is that workers will use their wages to pay for housing,
food, and other needs. However, if wages are inadequate to provide for a household’s
consumption, then there is a need for the state to supplement workers’ wages.25
22In the U.S. context, race and ethnicity are also major predictors for working in low-wage and low-quality
jobs.
23As already noted, there is a larger population of elderly or retired workers that need to be managed. So
far it has become politically untenable to disrupt funding for these populations.
24See Nancy Fraser and Linda Gordon, “A Genealogy of ‘Dependency’: Tracing a Keyword in the US
Welfare State" in Fraser 2013.
25Private charities, such as food banks or other direct service organizations, also work to help families
make ends meet when their incomes are insufficient. Not surprisingly, the non-profit sector also expanded
in the neoliberal era. Although beyond the scope of this paper, the role of the non-profit sector in stabilizing
the neoliberal SSA is an important topic to consider. Of particular interest is the role that non-profits play in
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It is important to remember that middle class workers are also major beneficiaries
of state redistribution, especially tax expenditures. Just as workers in low-wage jobs re-
quire subsidies to make ends meet, the middle class is also reliant on social benefits and
reduced taxation to maintain its standard of living in the neoliberal era. This is most ob-
vious when one looks at credits for childcare, homeownership, or retirement saving. This
type of consumption and savings behavior are being subsidized by the state, presumably
because there was political will to incentivize these economic activities. But it also begs
the question to what extent these tax policies are necessary in order to maintain middle-
class workers’ standard of living given the deterioration of real wages and the erosion of
employer-based benefits.
Whether policy redistributes income to the poorest workers or to the middle class,
wages are being subsidized by the state. In the words of de Brunhoff (1978), “Whatever
its form and mode of operation, the main task of the state’s management of labour-power
is to assume responsibility for the part of its value which capitalists do not directly re-
munerate" (19). From this logic, we can interpret the positive net social wage as evidence
of the state having to step in and protect workers from the true effect of neoliberalism.
In other words, it is possible that the state is using fiscal policy to accommodate the un-
acceptably low level of wages and employer-based benefits that have resulted from ne-
oliberalism, for low and middle-income earners alike. If this interpretation were true, it
would suggest that the level of degradation of the situation of workers is limited by so-
cially, historically, and politically determined levels of subsistence, as well as by capital’s
needs for an employable and productive labor force.
In addition to putting additional strain on public finances and contributing to bud-
get deficits, there are political economic consequences of neoliberal redistributive policy.
The fact that workers on different ends of the income distribution benefit from state re-
distribution is not always obvious, because much of state spending is “hidden" in the
tax code. For this reason, many of the beneficiaries of fiscal policy, in particular middle-
income workers, do not realize that they receive fiscal transfers. According to Steinmo
(2010), the consequences of tax expenditures rather than universal social programs means
that, “middle-class Americans increasingly feel that government spends money on ‘other
people’ even when the majority of public spending goes directly toward benefits for the
middle class" (Steinmo 2010, 154). For this reason, there is insufficient public support to
stop additional attacks on labor rights and the welfare state. In this way, U.S. fiscal pol-
icy, which includes transfers between and within classes, undermines solidarity among
workers, curtailing class-consciousness and labor’s potential to organize across the in-
come distribution.
As a strategy, these policies have succeeded in maintaining an available and cheap
pool of labor, as discussed by de Brunhoff. From the point of view of capitalist class,
this fiscal policy mix will increase profitability due to reduced wage bill. On the other
relieving some of the pressure that would otherwise be put on the state to supplement workers’ wages.
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hand, the net social wage data demonstrates that this aspect of the neoliberal SSA is not
less expensive for the state, but actually requires greater redistribution to labor. In other
words, what the net social wage reveals is that it can be more costly from the perspective
of the fiscal budget to increase tax subsidies for workers while decreasing subsidies for
non-waged social reproduction.
The high price of neoliberal fiscal policy mix is in many ways analogous to the effect of
the U.S. healthcare on increasing the positive net social wage. Just as the state has had to
redistribute more to workers due to the dynamics of the neoliberal labor market which it
enables through policy action and inaction, the state has had to bear the consequences of a
dysfunctional healthcare system. As the largest provider of health insurance in the United
States, the U.S. government has to pay the high cost of U.S. healthcare for nearly half of
the population, a problem that it is largely responsible for creating and maintaining with
its failure to provide a universal healthcare system that could curb healthcare inflation.
The state is also responsible for stabilizing class relations and mitigating the effect of
an unstable macroeconomy. Since the economy has becomemore volatile in the neoliberal
era due to deregulation and financialization, the state has also had to shoulder the burden
of supporting the unemployed and underemployed. Such social programswill “grow and
contract as a function of relations of social power... particularly [in response to] the effects
of mass unemployment upon the social order" (de Brunhoff 1978, 27). Due to the struc-
ture and design of automatic stabilizers, and increased political and economic pressure of
unemployment, the state is unlikely to be able to avoid redistributive or counter-cyclical
policy during times of economic recession. A positive net social wage in the 21st century
could also suggest that the burden of the recessionary period is being felt more strongly
by the underpaid, underemployed, unemployed, and discouraged workers whose col-
lective earnings have fallen so dramatically as not to keep up with social spending and
automatic stabilizers.
6 Conclusion
This paper has examined the net incidence of fiscal transfers between workers and the
state in the neoliberal era, with special attention to the 21st century. We have found the
surprising result that in the aggregate, workers have received more in social benefits than
they have paid in taxes in the neoliberal era. However, some of this has to do with rising
healthcare costs and automatic stabilizers. Another sizable portion of this has to do with
the Reagan/Clinton refundable tax credits and the Bush/Obama tax cuts. Finally, the role
of the Great Recession in terms of severe economic hardship felt by millions of long-time
unemployed Americans cannot be ignored. From the analysis presented in this paper,
it seems as if the variations in the net social wage are due to a combination of factors,
including: demographic shifts which have increased spending on income support for
elderly and low-income people, increased costs of health insurance which have increased
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the costs of Medicare and Medicaid (without increasing the actual “wage"), neoliberal tax
cuts and the growth of refundable tax credits, and the “intensity" of unemployment and
economic hardship experienced during the Great Recession.
This data can also be interpreted as revealing something about the nature of neolib-
eralism. An interpretation grounded in the political economy theories of Kotz (2015) and
de Brunhoff (1978), illuminate the role that fiscal and redistributive policy, as one aspect
of the SSA, play in stabilizing the neoliberal economy. While advocates of a strong wel-
fare state might prefer that workers receive more in benefits than they pay in taxes, the
existence of a positive net social wage may be evidence of the worsening of conditions for
the working class, not improvement. While unintuitive, a modest or zero net social wage
may actually indicate a better economic and political context for workers than high levels
of the net social wage.
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